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Robustness of road network for assessing the resilience of the network 
ABSTRACT 
 
Road network infrastructures are important public assets that play crucial services in economic 
development like trade and community services like emergency services. The absence of road 
network connectivity by flooding, accident, strategic terrorist attack and traffic jam critically and 
strongly affects the operation of the entire road network [1]. Using a representative three km 
radius OSM sample data of Addis Abeba‟s city road network and by measuring the giant 
component size and diameter change caused by both strategic and random node removal, we 
assessed the robustness of the network. By simultaneously analyzing the robustness result with 
global efficiency measure, as an availability measure of the route, we finally assessed the 
resilience of the network. Our result shows that from giant component size measure, the road 
network was robust from randomly removing 24% pc value of nodes than strategically removing 
4% pc value of nodes. The diameter measure increases from 39 to 51 paths and from 39 to 43 
paths against random and strategic node removal respectively. From diameter measure, we 
conclude that a decreasing diameter measure in response to BC based strategic node removal 
does not always show a robust network. Rather, the physical structural connectivity determines 
the robustness measure. In conclusion, greater than 88% of the network was vulnerable for both 
strategic and random node removal and were not able to be robust and resilient as well. Thus, 
this finding gives an ample understanding of the cities road network robustness and resilience. 
Therefore, city planners and administrators can infer about the need of the cities road networks 
re-design and expansion activities.  Additionally, this study helps them to see the city road 
network‟s vulnerability against betweenness centrality based strategic attack than randomly 
attacking the road network and this later helps to identify points of BC measures.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Road infrastructures are important public assets that play crucial services in economic 
development like trade and community services like emergency services. The absence of road 
network connectivity, rapid urbanization, increased motorization and population number, and 
poor public transport system is challenges of this infrastructure. Of these, road network 
connectivity is critical and strongly affects the operation (use) of the entire road infrastructure 
[1]. Urban planners and administrators thrive to maintain and assure those crucial services 
specifically transport and movement of people, goods, and ambulance and police services.  
The increasing motorization level and absence of well-connected road network challenge the 
availability of those services within the city. However, increasing road infrastructure level in 
terms of its size and strength against disturbances like flooding, traffic jam, accident, and 
terrorist attacks helps to achieve the goal of having an adequate and a well-connected road 
network. The presence of such a well-connected road network facilitates a successful delivery of 
the above-mentioned services.   
A well-connected road network is composed of an integral node and edge components. Removal 
of those components either randomly or strategically [2] from the road network leads to a 
disconnection or collapse of the entire network[3]. Road network robustness, an important 
property of a network, is the ability of a network to withstand the removal of such components 
i.e. nodes and edges ([2], [4]and [5]).  
Over the last few decades, a large number of methods was developed within the network science 
community to study road network robustness([5],  [6] and [4]). Since city road networks have a 
high probability of exposer to any of those disturbances, it is difficult to generalize the cities road 
network robustness only from either strategic or random node removal perspectives. Thus, 
exposing a road network to both random and strategic node removal techniques helps to better 
assess and make a better generalization about the road networks robustness property [7]. 
Road network resilience, the other important property of the road network, also helps to measure 
the persistence of the network and its ability to absorb disturbance and preserve the 
connectivity[8]. There are too much misunderstanding and unclear definition and applications 
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between robustness and resilience [9]. According to the definition of robustness, it measures the 
general strength of the network against the removal of its components. Whereas, resilience not 
only measures the strength of the network but it also measures the availability of any route, in 
our case road route, between points within the network after the network loses its robustness.  
Originally, a network has one robustness property measure at one point in time, independent of 
the node removal technique, and it changes over time in response to node removal. Thus, those 
property measures i.e. robustness and resilience of a road network behave differently against the 
application of random and strategic node removal techniques. This leads us to the conclusion of 
robustness and resilience measure being different for different node removal techniques.  
In order to change the road network from connected to the disconnected network, some critical 
amount of node should be removed from the network by applying a strategic or random node 
removal technique [2]. This breakage point (amount of node removed) is called the critical 
percolation probability pc [10]. Both road network robustness and resilience measures use this pc 
point to assess the robustness and resilience of the network. We will now rethink those measures 
and demonstrate our method to assess the resilience of the network from robustness measure by 
removing nodes using both strategic and random node removal techniques. 
In this study, it was of interest to assess the road networks resilience from its robustness measure 
while applying both strategic and random node removal techniques. To achieve this goal, we 
measure and compare the networks diameter and giant component size for both strategic and 
random node removal techniques. Additionally, to assess the resilience of the road network, we 
developed a novel methodology by simultaneously analyzing global efficiency and robustness 
measures i.e. diameter and giant component size into one integrated double axis line graphs.  
In particular, to achieve the research goals this study analyzes the following research questions:  
 What is the critical point of node removal to lose its connectivity? 
 What is robustness of the road network against node removal?  
 What is the resilience of the road network based on robustness measure? 
 Which node removal technique results for a more robust and resilient road network? 
 
3 
 
To achieve those goals and objectives while addressing the above-mentioned research questions, 
we used a sample road network that can be a very good input for the study. Addis Abeba‟s city 
road network data, which suffered from flooding, traffic congestion, and motor vehicle accidents, 
was downloaded from OSM and pre-processed for the study. Additionally, as far as we know, 
there no previous research has investigated those questions and the robustness and resilience of 
the city‟s road network. From this study, the main achievements, including contributions to the 
network science community, would be to give a general robustness and resilience impression of 
the cities road network, Addis Ababa.  
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2. RELATED WORK  
In this chapter, we present a brief review of existing works in the context of road network 
robustness and resilience assessment from defining and conceptualizing network robustness and 
resilience in selecting centrality metrics. This chapter also presents two percolation methods 
(strategic node removal and failure) as a part of robustness and resilience assessment as well as 
post percolation measurements like diameter and giant component measures. The first section 
presents the road network structure and then the second section discusses road network 
robustness and resilience. The final sub-section presents centrality measures used for robustness 
and resilience assessment.  
2.1. Road network structure  
The term network refers to the assembly of routes between nodes as a system of locations and 
route is a single link between two nodes([11] and [12]). The connection and arrangement of a 
network are represented by a graph G = {V, E}, where V is a collection of nodes connected by 
edge E with the direction( [13] and [14]). However, networks with two adjacent and opposite 
one-directional edges are undirected networks.   
Measuring network properties like degree distribution P(k), k is a degree, (Figure 2.1) helps to 
understand network structure [12]. Such a measurement of networks property enables us to 
categorize a network as random e.g. road network, small-world and scale-free networks e.g. 
airline network[11]. Random networks [15] has a typical Poisson degree distribution property- a 
homogenous connectivity distribution property of the network - with a high average value and 
decline exponentially (Figure 2.1 a).  
A significant recent discovery, small world network, by [16] is a new form of network. Small-
world networks are characterized with a sufficient slow mean short distance increment between 
nodes as the number of nodes in the network increases. The concept of a small world network 
was, in fact, important to show the topological proximity of distant nodes [17].  
Remarkable recent research in the field of complex networks like the Internet, metabolic 
networks and road network is the statement of scale-free networks. Scale-free networks have a 
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power-law form of connectivity distributions i.e. connectivity distribution increases as a node are 
added to the network ([16], [18], [12] and [19]) ( Figure 2.1 b).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1   (Adopted from [19]): Differences between a Random node removal or exponential network—
a U.S. roadmap and a scale-free network—an airline routing map 
Measuring the structure of the network using its connectivity helps to understand the topologic 
and geometric variation of the network structure [13].  
In terms of road networks, the irregularity of such structures mostly comes from the construction 
of the road in a different period of time[11]. Additionally, a limited road capacity, vast 
investment to build long distance roads and a high cost of each link to be attached to a given 
node are a couple of other reasons that make road network structure irregular [19].  
The presence of those reasons about irregular road network structure does not make urban roads 
are homogenous. Homogeneous road networks nodes have almost the same number of edge 
connections. Small-world and random network exhibit such behavior and show a peaking 
 
A B 
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average value connectivity distribution behavior and this distribution decays exponentially 
(Figure 2.1 a) [12]. But, the presence of a differentiated operation like highways, tunnels and 
functional properties like Collectors, arterials rather makes urban road networks heterogeneous 
[13].  
2.2. Centrality measure  
A node located in the center of a network is assumed to be more central than any other nodes 
[20]. However, the question of how to identify this central node from other nodes within the 
network becomes an ambiguity for such centrality concept. Every node within the network has 
positional information [21] like a number of edges connected to a node and distance from 
another node. [21] used such positional information‟s of a node to tackle those ambiguities in 
identifying a specific central node.   
According to [21], It was able to come up with three different positional information categories 
possessed by the central node. Those central node positional information categories are:  
 A central node can be a node with maximum possible degree i.e. a number of connected 
edges to the central node.  
 A central node can be a node located between the largest possible numbers of other points 
within the shortest path and  
 A central node can be a node located close to another node with a minimum distance.  
Thus, based on the above three central nodes positional information category, [21] introduced 
degree, betweenness and closeness centrality measures respectively to the network science 
community.  
Betweenness centrality was originally proposed by [22] equation (1) which were later 
implemented in networkx by [23] as.  
      ∑
        
           
                                                Equation (1) 
Where V is the set of nodes, σ(s,t)) is the number of shortest paths between node s and t, 
and σ(s,t|v) is the number of those paths passing through some node v other than s,t. In this case, 
If s=t, σ(s,t)=1, and if v s,t, σ(s,t|v)=0 [23].  
7 
 
Generally, betweenness centrality measures the other nodes dependence on a given node, and 
therefore it is a potential controller measure [24]. A related measure to betweenness centrality 
i.e. closeness centrality which measures the average length of the shortest path between a node 
and all other nodes ([24] and [20]). 
There is a hot debate about the correlation between centrality measures. [25] examined that both 
closeness and degree centrality measures are highly correlated. [25] also argue that all centrality 
measures have different mathematical equations, refer to [26] and [22] equations, and this results 
in different centrality measurement values.  
Most importantly, centrality measures help to identify influential and significant nodes within a 
network. Depending on the type of network like road, social, internet and epidemic network 
significant nodes have different interpretations for different networks. For example, a significant 
road network node helps to connect nodes using edges and removing this node makes the 
network to lose its connectivity. On the other hand, a significant node in a disease outbreak 
network will have a different meaning, which is vaccinating a host person, a significant node, 
will stop the transmission of disease. 
A great number of authors have discussed the application of centrality measure in assessing the 
robustness i.e. strength of the road network against node removal. For example, research by [27] 
and [28] applies Betweenness, Closeness, Degree, and Eigenvector centrality measures to 
investigate the robustness of the road network. Over time, an extensive literature has shown the 
applicability of centrality measure to assess the robustness of a network against node removal 
([27],[29],[30] and [22]). Those studies affirm that betweenness centrality measure is a common 
centrality measure used to study networks property like robustness [25].  
However, addressing questions regarding the high computation time for computing betweenness 
centrality measure raises an enormous concern. A previous study ([24]and [31]) shows the need 
for high computation time to calculate betweenness centrality. [32] acknowledged and addressed 
this problem using his new street network-analyzing toolkit, OSMnx. According to Boeing, this 
toolkit is a computationally efficient tool to compute network statistics like betweenness 
centrality.    
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2.3. Percolation  
The interconnection between the network‟s component i.e. nodes and edges determines the 
function of networks. The removal of some of those components from the network raises 
questions regarding the network's connection and function in general [3]. The nature of node 
removal i.e. random and strategic determines the robustness of the network. In a random node 
removal, each node in the network is removed with the same probability [2] and a strategic node 
removal depends on the centrality measure types of the network [27] (discussed in section 2.2). 
As a result, the removal of a critical amount of nodes either strategically or randomly changes 
the network from connected to the disconnected network and this phenomenon is addressed 
using percolation theory [2].   
Many researchers demonstrate numerous efforts to examine the network's connectivity by 
removing nodes either randomly or strategically ([33], [34], [2] and [10]). From those studies, 
after a continuous node removal, there is some critical point where a network changes from 
connected to the disconnected network in response to the node removal and this point is called 
critical percolation probability pc [10]. This critical point helps to determine or answer the 
question of network robustness and resilience. Therefore, the conclusion of road networks 
robustness and resilience comes from the consideration of pc.  
2.4. Road network Robustness and Resilience  
Road networks exposure to unforeseen hazards like incidents, traffic jams and floods is getting a 
growing awareness [35]. Robustness and resilience assessment against such an incident helps to 
measure the road networks strength. 
2.4.1. Road network robustness  
The presence of a connected road network determines the success of economic development like 
trade and social activities (e.g., working, recreation, freight, etc.). However, the performance of 
such a connected road network is also challenged by incidents like traffic congestion, terrorist 
attack, flooding, and a car accident [34]. The insensitiveness of the road network to such an 
incident is assessed using the robustness measure of the road network [35]. According to [35], 
“robustness is the extent to which, under pre-specified circumstances, a network is able to 
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maintain the function for which it was originally designed”. This approach helps assures the 
availability of a connected network by considering the extent to which the network can tolerate 
those pre-specified circumstances or disturbance. The author also suggests that, since those pre-
specified circumstances are hard to set, policymakers are required to make a pre-specified 
circumstance or disturbance choices.    
Most recent studies focus on robustness assessment of road networks using single disturbance, 
which is without considering concurrent incidents like a terrorist attack, flooding, or car 
accidents. A study by [36] in Hong Kong examines the robustness of a road network with 
multiple incidents and found out as a quite different and complete measure than single 
disturbance measure. On another study by [2], it was possible to examine the robustness of the 
network after removing influential and random node removal nodes.  
The networks change from such node removal (strategic and random node removal) can be 
recorded using the network's properties like the giant component size – a growing network 
component size in proportion to the number of nodes - and diameter of the network. [29] applied 
the giant component size measure to study the robustness of the network against all possible 
strategic node removals of the undirected networks. Because of this approach, calculating the 
giant component size during all network random and strategic attack is simple and practical for 
robustness measure [5].   
Network diameter is also one of robustness assessments measure. Most of the time, robust 
networks are characterized by a small diameter measure [37]. Indeed, a small diameter certainly 
points toward all the nodes are in the vicinity and the network is compact [30].  However, a 
smaller increment of network diameter upon nodes removal also makes the network robust [38]. 
A few low-degrees with high-load and highly connected nodes of the network are properties of 
this measure [5] have also advocated the use of robustness assessment using diameter measure to 
promote bus network design.  
2.4.2. Road network resilience  
A closer look into the concept and definition of resilience articulates a number of disparities. 
There are more than 25 definitions of resilience from different study perspectives (e.g., road, 
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biology, internet) [9]. In this section of the thesis, we discussed some of the leading thoughts of 
resilience that is significant for this work.   
The pioneering concept of resilience by [8] from an ecological point of view measures the 
persistence of a system and absorbance of disturbance and thus maintains the populations‟ 
relationship. Holling‟s work focused on the measurement of the continuity of the system by 
measuring the resistance and absorbance of disturbances.  [4] also measure the resilience of the 
road network by measuring the recovery time from such a disturbance. The resilience 
measurement using Calvert and Snelder method was possible to measure the recovery time of the 
road network from traffic congestion. Additionally, natural systems as protein-protein-interaction 
(PPI) networks are prominent examples to show such an ability to retain its functions back from 
failures and strategic node removals [39]. An immense misperception and misunderstood of 
resilience comes from [35] work and [35] presented resilience as one element of robustness. 
Resilience was also abstracted by [40] in disaster management study and was able to see 
resilience from a reduced probability of failure of the network, reduced recovery time and 
minimal negative consequence. This approach involves measuring the resiliency level of the 
network before losing tolerance from disturbance[41]. [40] also show that resilience can be 
measured using recovery time from failure. Thus, the [40] considered a network with reduced 
recovery time, reduced result of failure and less chance of the work for failure as a resilient 
network.  
Road network resilience was also examined by [42] as road networks ability to adopt adaptive 
and transformative approaches to give the needed service while the network is under disturbance 
[43]. In this article, the author considers the adaptive and transformative approaches for resisting 
strategic node removals to facilitate the network routine services.   
A leading and sturdy argument of resilience in road network comes from the [44] work which 
[27] later use the concept to evaluate network robustness. The most accepted and leading [44]  
work on the structure and function of a network highlights the networks function dependence on 
connectivity or the existence of paths between nodes. Removing nodes from a network increases 
the length of the path between nodes and this creates a less resilient network. This approach was 
helpful to examine the resilience of the network for such node removal [45].   
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[46] examine the robustness and resilience of the network with time. The author presents the 
assumption that a network will be robust for a short period but becomes fragile and will not 
guarantee the long-term resilience of the network. From this, the robustness and resilience of a 
network are two different measures.  
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3. METHODOLOGY AND TOOLS 
3.1. Introduction  
This section of the thesis outlines the study methods used to conduct the research (Figure 2). The 
researcher describes the tools used and how the required data collected, processed and analyzed 
to address the research questions and objectives. Reasons and justifications about data 
acquisition and pre-processing, network analysis, centrality measure, percolation, robustness, and 
resilience assessment techniques used are given. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. General study methodology flow diagram 
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3.2. Data download and pre-processing   
In this study, we used an open source tool - OSMnx and networkx - to work with OpenStreetMap 
(OSM) street network data for robustness and resilience assessment of the Addis Abeba‟s road 
network. OpenStreetMap, a collaborative worldwide mapping project, makes its spatial data 
accessible through different APIs (OpenStreetMap contributors, 2018). On the other hand, 
OSMnx, a Python efficient research tool, easily downloads OSM data for any place name, 
location and polygon for analysis and visualization [32] of spatial data. Additionally, using 
OSMnx, we can download and build topologically correct, project and plot the street networks, 
and finally saved for advanced use in a shapefile data format.  
 
Figure 3.2. The drivable street network for Addis Abeba, created by passing location query of “9.017043, 
38.752561” with 3 km radius into OSMnx. 
Robustness and resilience assessment of the whole city road network in terms of computer 
processing and time is expensive. Thus, to define the study site and its spatial boundary we use 
data within 5 km distance to all four directions (North, South, East, and West) from a point 
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location. Based on the researchers supervised knowledge of the city, we use the city hall‟s 
location (9.035036, 38.750851) as a center point. Such area coverage of the data is supposed to 
be a typical road network of the study area.  
3.3. Data preprocessing 
Data preprocessing (also called data preparation) is imperative when working with OSM data. 
The main purpose of data preprocessing is to transform the road network data so that the 
information contained within the data is best prepared for the analysis. Road network data 
downloaded from OSM has insignificant street curves represented as nodes on the edge of the 
network, which is not a typical or true node. Those nodes are not typical nodes in the sense of 
network theory and contribute for petty conclusions about the result. Therefore, we identify and 
remove those nodes using [32] “simplify” algorithm and merge the set of edges between “true or 
typical” network nodes into a single edge. Thus, confiscating such nodes from the edge of the 
network is important before actual network analysis. Additionally, In order to locate and 
facilitate for later network computation like area, re-projection of the road network data into 
universal transverse Mercator (UTM) were another pre-process we performed.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. A) non-graph-theoretic nodes highlighted in red and true nodes in blue, B) strictly simplified 
network,) 
 
 
A) B) 
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3.4. Betweenness centrality measure  
To address the research questions and achieve objectives a centrality measure was implemented 
from networkx [47] over a pre-processed road network data, as explained in this section below.  
In this study, we applied betweenness centrality measures to identify a node with the highest 
betweenness centrality measure for a strategic node removal purpose. We implement the Ulrik 
Brandes algorithm equation (1) of networkx for the most prominent betweenness centrality 
measurement [23] in assessing the robustness of the road network using the following input 
parameters:  
G K Normalized weight Endpoints 
A Simplified road network None True None False 
Table 3.1. Betweenness centrality input parameters  
In this case, G is a downloaded and simplified road network from OSM and K is an optional 
integer value for the number of nodes to consider for estimating betweenness. For K, we use 
“None” to let the algorithm consider completely simplified road network nodes and get better 
approximation value. We also normalized the betweenness values by 2/((n-1)(n-2)) for the 
undirected network where n is the number of nodes in G and 2 is used to make our network un-
directed two-way network, the normalization was set to “True”.  
Since we are working on the networks node, we did not consider edges “weight” for this study. 
Thus, this parameter was set as “None”. Additionally, the endpoints of the edge were not 
connecting other nodes through a short distance (the main concept behind betweenness centrality 
is a node used as a bridge) and thus this parameter was “False”.   
Finally, from such a configuration of betweenness centrality computation, it returns a dictionary 
of sorted nodes based on the highest betweenness centrality values. To assess the robustness and 
resilience of the road network, we strategically removed those nodes with the highest 
betweenness centrality value (section 3.4.2).   
3.5. Strategic and random node removal  
It has been discussed earlier that Addis Abeba‟s city road network suffers from traffic jam, 
flooding, and car accidents disturbances. Thus, in order to understand the road networks 
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robustness and resilience against those disturbances; we use the highest betweenness centrality 
value, computed in section 3.4, to simulate and remove nodes strategically. We also applied a 
random node removal technique to assess the robustness and resilience of the road network. 
In the case of random node removal, we decided to fail ten nodes and calculate an average 
dimensional property from these ten failures. This number was chosen because it reflects an 
optimum maximum and minimum limit of random removal measures. Then again, in order to see 
how those measurements for ten node removals spread out from the average (mean), we also 
computed a standard deviation and plot and error bar.  
3.6. Road network measurement 
After each repetitive strategic and random node removal, using the networkx algorithms, we 
measure the diameter of the network, giant component size (in this case, a network with a giant 
component size of 1 is connected and 0 is totally disconnected) and global efficiency until the 
network is disintegrated (figure 2). We selected those measures because those measures are 
successfully applied for robustness and resilience assessment ([48],[45], [30], [38] and [37]) & 
we also believe using those measure will help to clarify the robustness and resilience of the study 
areas road network.    
To evaluate the city‟s road network robustness (section 3.7) and resilience (section 3.8) against 
the strategic and random node removals, we perform a serious of experiments in order to register 
those measures i.e. diameter, giant component size, and global efficiency. Those repetitive 
centrality measures and node removal experiments depicted in Figure 2 for strategic node 
removal summarized below: 
1. Identify the most significant node using betweenness centrality measure. 
2.  Remove a node from the network with highest betweenness centrality value.  
3. Measure giant component size, diameter and global efficiency of the network after node 
removal. 
4. Recalculate the highest betweenness centrality and remove that node.  
5. Then, repeat the above process and register the network measures until the network loses 
its connectivity.  
3.7. Road network robustness assessment   
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We study the robustness of the road network under random as well as BC based strategic node 
removal. We analyzed giant component size and diameter of the network simultaneously against 
the fraction of nodes removed for each node removals i.e. strategic and random node removal 
(section 3.6 & figure 4).  
The critical percolation probability pc [10] was used to determine the network's robustness i.e. 
below pc the network is going to be not a robust and above pc, the network becomes robust 
network (see section 2.3). In this way, we were able to assess the road network robustness from 
the simultaneous analyzes of diameter and giant component size measures against the fraction of 
the node removed from the network.  
 
 
Figure 3.4.  Robustness assessment procedure 
3.8. Road network resilience assessment   
In this section, we adapt [8] definition of resilience which is a “persistence measure of the 
network and of its ability to absorb change and disturbance and maintain the connectivity 
between nodes”. To implement this concept, we developed a novel methodology for the 
assessment of road network resilience by simultaneously analyzing global efficiency and 
robustness assessments measures. Thus, using this methodology we were able to examine the 
resilience of the road network by plotting the availability of route using global efficiency against 
the road network robustness.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5. Resilience assessment plots.  a) Global efficiency measure from strategic and random node 
removal   b) A simultaneous analyze of global efficiency and robustness measures. 
Plot (Robustness) 1: 
1.1. Plot giant component size from strategic and random node removal against fraction of node removed.    
1.2.  Plot diameter from strategic and random node removal against fraction of node removed.  
b
) 
Plot (Resilience): 
1. Robustness plot 1.1 vs. Global efficiency 
2. Robustness plot 1.2  vs. Global efficiency 
Plot (Global efficiency): 
Plot global efficiency from strategic & random node removal against fraction of node removed. 
a
) 
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4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION  
4.1. Road network robustness assessment   
Giant component size measure  
According to figure 4.1 A, a 4% fraction of a strategic node removal from betweenness centrality 
results in a rapid decrease of the giant component size to 0.0922, which is almost a collapsed 
network. This study confirms the findings of [33] wherein betweenness centrality based strategic 
node removal gives worst-case robustness of the road network. Whereas, as shown in figure 4.1 
A, robustness measure from giant component size against random node removal shows a 
progressive decrease of the road networks size. In this case, to completely shutdown the whole 
network using random node removal, we need to remove 24% of the road network nodes. This 
situation makes the road network more robust against random node removal than a betweenness 
centrality based strategic node removal.  
The error bar line graph in figure 4.1 A also shows that the maximum and minimum giant 
component size standard deviation measures from ten randomly removed nodes was 0.1045 and 
0.0007 respectively.  Graphically, we can understand that the difference between the maximum 
and minimum giant component size standard deviation measures between 11 and 20% fraction of 
node removal is higher than below or above this amount of node removal.    
This result demonstrates two things. First, network robustness measure from betweenness 
centrality based strategic node removal results in a less robust road network than that of 
robustness assessment from random node removal. Second, the error bar from random node 
removal in giant component giant component size measurement gives a good impression for 
taking an optimum random node removal from the network rather than only concluding about 
road network robustness from one random removal. Generally, the road network was more 
robust against random node removal than that of BC-based strategic node removal and this result 
relates with the BC-based node removal robustness experiment result of [49] and [33].  
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Figure 4.1. Road network robustness assessment from diameter and giant component size measure 
against BC-based strategic node removal and random node removal. (A) Giant component size from BC-
based strategic and random node removal (B) Diameter from BC-based and random node removal 
Diameter measure 
Figure 4.1 B shows the number of paths needed to complete the maximum distance between all 
pairs of nodes i.e. diameter for each repetitive strategic and random node removal. In the case of 
random node removal, approximately 13% fraction of node removal from the network results 
from 39 to 51 number of path increment to complete the diameter. This increment of diameter 
indicates the decreasing of the road networks robustness as we apply a random node removal. 
The remaining fraction of node removal i.e. greater than 13% node removal shows a progressive 
decrease of paths and this also indicates that as the diameter decreases the road networks 
becomes more robust.  
Interestingly, but perhaps not surprisingly, our result from betweenness centrality based strategic 
node removal shows a smaller diameter measure than diameter measure from random node 
removal. In this case, the road networks diameter increases from 39 to 43 numbers of paths 
against about 3% betweenness centrality based strategic node removal. This situation makes the 
road network to be less robust against random than strategic node removal. [49] claims 
robustness of a road network from a small increment of the network‟s diameter upon the removal 
of nodes. But, based on the general notion of robustness measurement, road network robustness 
decreases against strategic node removal, this decreasing road network diameter against BC-
based strategic node removal is unexpected.  
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Despite such a surprising result, thinking better of betweenness centrality and diameter measure 
relations would offer answers. The network diameter measures the amount of path between two 
most distant nodes [30] and small diameter entails that all the nodes are just located in a close 
distance [50]. Thus, based on those thoughts and BC property (see section 3.4) we want to argue 
in a way that it is not always possible to get a robust network with a small or decreasing 
diameter. We rather need to consider the effect of node removal on the giant component size of 
the road network.  
As we discussed in section 3.4, BC measures the number of shortest paths between node s and t 
passing through some node v. When node v with high BC measure removed from the network, 
all those nodes connected to node v within a short distance either are disconnected or will not be 
part of a connected network. As the network giant component size decrease, the network 
diameter also becomes smaller. From this argument, it is not possible to conclude that the road 
network using the BC strategic node removal in figure 4.1 B is robust or not robust. We rather 
prefer to experiment further, figure 4.2 & 4.3, in a way that the conclusion about BC based 
robustness measure using diameter i.e. an increasing diameter for non-robust network and 
decreasing diameter for the robust network has different implications.  Accordingly, we took 
two-network types i.e. better connected (figure 4.2) and less connected network (figure 4.3) and 
assess how robustness measure responses from strategic node removal using diameter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Diameter measure change from betweenness centrality based node removal (relatively 
well-connected network). 
 
Node: 77                                              Node: 76                                          Node: 75 
Edge: 214              Edge: 216          Edge: 200 
Diameter: 13 paths                               Diameter: 15 paths                        Diameter: 20 paths 
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As we can see in figure 4.2, a well-connected network exhibits the presumed robustness measure 
i.e. an increasing diameter for non-robust network against BC based node removal. However, a 
less connected network on figure 4.3 shows the same trend of diameter change as the actual 
network study in response to a strategic removal of nodes. Thus, from this experiment, we can 
conclude that a decreasing diameter measure in response to BC based strategic node removal 
does not always show a robust network. The physical structural connectivity (as shown in figure 
4.2 & 4.3) also determines the robustness measure-using diameter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3: Diameter measure change from betweenness centrality based node removal 
(relatively less connected network)  
Robustness comparison from diameter & giant component size measures   
As we discussed in section 4.1 about figure 4.1 (A), based on the first diameter measurement of 
the road network against BC-based strategic node removal and random node removal diameter, 
the network was considered more robust against strategic node removal. Nevertheless, when the 
amount of node removal from BC-based strategic node removal increases, the diameter of the 
network abruptly decreases and this leads us for a presentation of different argument regarding 
diameter measure for robustness measure from BC-based node removal.    
According to figure 4.1 (B), the effect of the BC-based strategic node removal was visible and 
the giant component size drops abruptly whereas random node removal demonstrates a 
progressive decrease of the network giant component size. Therefore, the road network was less 
robustness against BC-based strategic node removal than random node removal and additionally, 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Node: 47                                            Node: 46                              Node: 45 
Edge: 114              Edge: 106          Edge: 100 
Diameter: 11 paths                            Diameter: 15 paths            Diameter: 8 paths 
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assessing the road network robustness from diameter measure of the road network against BC-
based node removal not recommended.     
4.2. Road network resilience assessment    
Figure 4.4 shows that a BC-based strategic node removal results in a sharp decrease in the 
availability of a route, from global efficiency measure than random node removal. Removing 
node randomly results for better availability of the possible route and show a progressive decline 
before the network completely collapse. Thus, BC-based strategic node removal results for a 
better understanding of the road network‟s weakness against strategic attacks like a terrorist 
attack. Accordingly, identifying and managing those weaknesses helps to assure the availability 
of services like economical and social services using the city road networks route.  
 
Figure 4.4: Global efficiency measure from BC-based strategic and random node removal  
Resilience assessment from the giant component size and global efficiency 
According to figure 4.5, in response to about 2% fraction of node removal, both giant 
component size and global efficiency show the same changes. However, strategically removing 
2% - 16% of the node from the road network results in a quick drop of giant component size 
and a relatively slow change of global efficiency.   
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Figure 4.5: Road network resilience measure from the giant component size and global efficiency against 
betweenness centrality based strategic and random node removal.  
Thus, even though the giant component size declines too fast from the beginning of the strategic 
node removal, global efficiency measure shows some persistence between 2% to 16% fraction of 
node removal. The global efficiency persistence in maintaining route helps to have some 
availability of route within the network before the network completely collapsed.  From this, it is 
possible to conclude and suggest that we can achieve resiliency from a small sized network than 
the big sized network. At the same time, based on global efficiency measure and BC-based 
strategic node removal, removing 2% - 16% fraction of nodes results in a slight availability of 
route than 2% node removal 
Resilience assessment from diameter and global efficiency  
According to figure 4.6, as diameter measure increase from 39 to 43 paths against 3% fraction of 
node removal from BC-based strategic node removal, global efficiency measure drops declines 
faster. In section 4.1 about figure 4.1 (B), we argued about the response of the network against 
BC-based strategic node removal in measuring the diameter. Thus, the decreasing measure of 
diameter from BC-based strategic node removal does not mean that the road network is robust 
against BC-based strategic node removal. Since BC considers nodes that are connected to a node 
within the shortest distance, by apply BC-based strategic node removal it rather shows the 
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disintegration of the network and formation of the smaller connected network. Generally, as 
diameter measure from BC-based strategic node removal shows a decline the network early loses 
its resiliency from global efficiency measure.  
Accordingly, while the network forms a small-connected network, the application of BC-based 
strategic node removal results for a less resilient network. The global efficiency measure from 
strategic node removal decreases as the number of paths needed to complete the maximum 
shortest distance i.e. diameter decreases.  
 
Figure 4.6: Road network resilience measure from diameter and global efficiency (G.efficiency) against 
betweenness centrality based strategic node removal.   
4.3 Limitations  
This study was backfired by large processing time and a need for high computation computer. 
Because of this problem, we were not able to apply to a large area. Additionally, It was a great 
relevant to the study and compare with other cities, other areas (urban, rural), or other countries. 
Thus, the scalability of the study was not addressed.   
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5. Conclusion  
Road network robustness is an important property of the network that determines the resistance 
of the network against strategic and random node removal. Due to the increasing probability of 
the road networks exposure to strategic and random actions, assessing this property of the road 
network against those actions becomes the first priority to pinpoint and generalize the 
susceptibility of the network and set significant management options.  Resilience is also the other 
measure of the networks extended functionality even after it loses its robustness. Combing those 
two measures, robustness and resilience give an ample understanding of the road networks 
status.   
A centrality measure of a network helps to identify the most significant node for the assessment 
of the road networks robustness and resilience. Centrality measures are of different types with a 
different concept and application needs. Among those, betweenness centrality measures are the 
most commonly used centrality measure in robustness and resilience assessment that considers 
the location of a node within the shortest distance from the other nodes. This centrality measure 
used to simulate the most important nodes in a network for later removal as an example of 
strategic node removal. Besides a centrality measure, randomly removing nodes from the 
network simulates any accidents that happen on the network random node. Thus, removing 
nodes by applying those measures and then measuring the networks change in terms of the 
networks physical property like diameter, giant component size and efficiency help to assess the 
networks robustness and resilience properties.  
In this study, we implement the above-mentioned concepts in order to assess the robustness of 
the road network for assessment of the road networks resilience. From giant component size 
measurement, a 20% fraction of node removal using random node removal techniques makes the 
road network robust than betweenness centrality based strategic node removals which only need 
a 4% fraction of the networks node to be removed to collapse the whole network. The robustness 
analyses using diameter measure also shows that the networks diameter increases from 39 to 51 
paths in case of random node removal while the diameter increases from 39 to 43 paths from 
strategic node removal. As we tried to argue in the result section of the document (section 4.1) 
that diameter, this result does not pass the correct message about robustness.   
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The reason is that, since both diameter and betweenness centrality measures depend on a 
measure of distance, the notion of increasing diameter from betweenness centrality based 
strategic node removal was not observed. BC considers a node within the shortest path and 
removal of this node collapse the size of the road network. We rather need to suggest that using 
diameter for robustness analysis of a road network is not a good measure.  
From the simultaneous analysis of robustness and global efficiency measures, we were able to 
assess the road network resiliency. As shown in figure 4.5, from the giant component size 
measure the network becomes less resilient as the giant component size decreases. However, 
when the fraction of nodes removed from the network is 2 to 16%, the network shows some 
perseverance in the availability of route from global efficiency measure. As shown in figure 4.3, 
at this stage of node removal, the network was almost a collapsed network and thus, it is difficult 
to say that the road network is resilient.  In conclusion, greater than 88% (figure 4.1, 4.4, 4.5 & 
4.6) of the network was vulnerable for both strategic and random node removal and were not 
able to be robust and resilient as well. Thus, from this miniature research, we believe that this 
finding gives an ample understanding of the cities road network robustness and resilience as well 
and the city planners and administrators can infer about the need of the cities road network re-
design and expansion activities. Additionally, this study helps them to see that the city‟s road 
network is more vulnerable to betweenness centrality based strategic attack than randomly 
attacking the road network.  
Future work  
From this study, we also come up with further research areas.  Future research should consider the 
potential effects of removing more than one node and taking the average measure of some sample of a 
node in case of random node removal more carefully. For example, a network giant component size 
measure form only one random node removal and from the average of some amount of randomly 
removed node does not have the same effect on the network giant component measure. Since there is no 
methodology for choosing a sample of random removals for a certain size of network it will be a huge 
input for the network science community. Future researches on robustness measure by extending 
physically visualize and see the cascading failure after strategic and random node removal will a huge 
topic. 
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